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trial,189 so too should they be admonished to refrain from indepen-
dent experimentation that might affect, in any way, their percep-
tion of material issues.
Brenda Eng Hom
Plaintiff's failure to use available seatbelt may be considered as
evidence of contributory negligence when the nonuse allegedly
causes the accident
Three general approaches have been developed to determine
the effect that nonuse of an available seatbelt has upon a plaintiff's
recovery in an action for personal injuries suffered in a motor vehi-
cle accident.9e New York has taken the position that although
189 CPL § 270.40 (1971). Section 270.40 mandates that preliminary instructions relating
to jury misconduct be given to the jury. Id. The statute provides that
[s]uch instructions must include, among other matters, admonitions that the ju-
rors may not converse among themselves or with anyone else upon any subject
connected with the trial; that they may not read or listen to any accounts or dis-
cussions of the case reported by newspapers or other news media; that they may
not visit or view the premises or the place where the offense or the offenses
charged were allegedly committed or any other premises or place involved in the
case; and that they must promptly report to the court any incident within their
knowledge involving an attempt by any person improperly to influence any mem-
ber of the jury.
Id. It is suggested that the statute be amended to include express references to independent
juror experimentation and juror conduct that reasonably may bear upon material issues.
190 Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920
(1974). One of the three approaches to the seatbelt defense is the negligence per se ap-
proach, which posits that in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident,
in a jurisdiction that has enacted a seatbelt installation statute, the plaintiff who failed to
use a seatbelt will be considered contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See Comment,
The Seat Belt Defense: A New Approach, 38 FORDHAM L. Rav. 94, 97 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Fordham Comment]; Comment, The Seat Belt Defense-A Valid Instrument of
Public Policy, 44 TENN. L. REv. 119, 122 (1976). Notably, no jurisdiction has accepted the
negligence per se approach, see, e.g., Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 291, 259 A.2d
145, 146 (Super. Ct. 1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 227, 230 A.2d 629, 635 (1967);
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 230, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968), since there exists no installa-
tion statute which mandates that seatbelts be worn, Comment, supra, at 122 & n.16; see
N.Y. VEH. & TRAM. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1970) (requires that seatbelts be installed in every
automobile manufactured after 1967, but does not require their use).
Another approach to the seatbelt defense is common-law contributory negligence, which
is premised upon the belief that a reasonably prudent automobile occupant would exercise
reasonable care for his own safety, and thus would use an available seatbelt. See Fordham
Comment, supra, at 97. The contributory negligence approach has been adopted by a small
number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harlan v. Curbo, 250 Ark. 610, 612, 466 S.W.2d 459, 460-
61 (1971); Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 981, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (Ct. App.
1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967). Of the courts
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nonuse of a seatbelt should not be considered in apportioning lia-
bility, it nevertheless may be evaluated in determining the amount
by which the plaintiff's damage recovery will be reduced.191 It has
been unclear, however, whether this approach should be followed
in cases where failure to use a seatbelt is an alleged cause of the
accident.19 2 Recently, in Curry v. Moser,193 the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that a plaintiff's nonuse of an available
seatbelt may be considered as evidence of contributory negligence
when such nonuse is an alleged proximate cause of the accident. 1 4
In Curry, the plaintiff was seated in the front passenger side
of the defendant Moser's vehicle 9 5 as it made a left turn onto a
four-lane thoroughfare. 96 During the turn, the front passenger
that have considered the contributory negligence approach, most have rejected it. See, e.g.,
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1976); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 52 Mich. App.
619, 622, 217 N.W.2d 900, 901 (Ct. App. 1974); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 55, 457 P.2d
483, 485 (1969).
The third approach to the seatbelt defense has been referred to as both mitigation of
damages and avoidable consequences. Fordham Comment, supra, at 99. This rule, which is
very similar to the doctrine of contributory negligence, see W. PROSSER, supra note 64, § 65,
at 422-23, "comes into play after a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damages may
still be averted, and bars recovery only for such damages," id. § 65, at 423; see Note, Seat
Belt Legislation and Judicial Reaction, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 371, 382 (1968). Thus, some
commentators have argued that the avoidable consequences approach is inapplicable to
seatbelt defense cases, because the failure to make use of a seatbelt occurs before the legal
wrong has occurred. See Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 613, 620-21 (1967).
"' See Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916,
920 (1974). In adopting the avoidable consequences approach, the Spier Court stated that
nonuse of an available seat belt.., is a factor which the jury may consider.., in
arriving at its determination as to whether the plaintiff has exercised due care, not
only to avoid injury to himself, but to mitigate any injury he would likely sustain.
However, .. . the plaintiff's nonuse... should be strictly limited to the jury's
determination of the plaintiff's damages and should not be considered by the tri-
ers of fact in resolving the issue of liability.
Id. (citation omitted).
" See 35 N.Y.2d at 451 n.3, 323 N.E.2d at 168 n.3, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.3. After
disapproving of the contributory negligence approach to the seatbelt defense, see id. at 450,
323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921, the Spier Court stated that "[n]ot involved in this
case, and not considered, is an issue in which the failure to wear a seat belt is an alleged
cause of the accident," id. at 451 n.3, 323 N.E.2d at 168 n.3, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.3.
193 89 App. Div. 2d 1, 454 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2d Dep't 1982).
I- Id. at 2, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
1,5 Id. at 3, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 312. The plaintiff was sitting sideways in her seat, convers-
ing with another passenger who was seated in the rear portion of the vehicle. Id. at 2, 454
N.Y.S.2d at 312.
I" Id. Prior to reaching the thoroughfare in question, the vehicle in which the plaintiff
was riding had negotiated several turns without encountering any problems. Id.
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door of the defendant's car inexplicably opened, 19 7 and the plain-
tiff, who was not wearing the available seatbelt, fell out on to the
roadway"9 " and was struck by a car driven by the defendant,
Cleary. 199 Prior to trial, the court denied the defendants' applica-
tion to allow introduction of the seatbelt issue during the liability
phase of the trial, as bearing upon the question of proximate
cause.200 During the damages phase of the trial, however, the Su-
preme Court, Trial Term, permitted the defendants to introduce
evidence with respect to the plaintiff's failure to use the available
seatbelt.20'
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, unani-
mously reversed,20 2 holding that evidence of a plaintiff's failure to
use an available seatbelt may be considered for purposes of appor-
tioning liability when the nonuse is an alleged cause of the acci-
dent.203 Writing for the court, Justice Brown rejected as factually
inapposite0 4 the approach adopted in Spier v. Barker, °5 wherein
197 Id. at 3, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 312-13. Evidence was introduced to the effect that the
plaintiff was unable to open the passenger door of the vehicle on the morning of the acci-
dent and thus was forced to enter the car from the driver's side. Id., 454 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
198 Id. According to the plaintiff's testimony, she did not lean on the door while in the
car, nor did she touch the interior part of the car as she fell out. Id.
199 Id. The vehicle driven by the defendant, Cleary, had been directly behind the auto-
mobile in which the plaintiff was travelling as both came to a stop in the left turn lane at a
traffic signal. Id. at 2, 454 N.Y.S.2d dt 312. When the light turned green, both cars turned
left, with the first vehicle proceeding into the left northbound lane, and the Cleary vehicle
turning wider into the right northbound lane. Id. at 3, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
200 Id. At the close of the liability portion of the trial, without hearing any testimony on
the failure of the plaintiff to wear her seatbelt, the jury found that the plaintiff and the two
defendants were negligent. Id. The plaintiff Curry and the defendant Moser were each
found 25 percent liable, while the defendant Cleary was found 50 percent liable. Id.
201 Id. Expert witnesses testified on the defendants' behalf that had the plaintiff been
using a seatbelt, she would not have fallen from the automobile and would not have sus-
tained any injuries. Id. An expert witness also testified that the seatbelts in the car in which
the plaintiff was riding were working properly. Id. The jury found that 100 percent of the
plaintiff's injuries were sustained because of her nonuse of the available seatbelt, but none-
theless reduced its $50,000 award by only $15,000. Id. The jury further reduced the award
by 25 percent based upon its comparative negligence findings. Id.
210 Justice Brown, who wrote the unanimous opinion, was joined by Justices Rubin,
Boyers, and Thompson.
2* 89 App. Div. 2d at 2, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 312. In addition to holding that the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seatbelt bore upon the question of liability, the Second Department con-
cluded that due to the "intertwined" issues of liability and damages present in the case, a
unified trial was necessary. Id. at 9, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
20, See id. at 7, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315. The court in Curry stated that the facts in the
case were "somewhat unique" insofar as the failure to wear a seatbelt not only caused the
injury, but also caused the accident. Id.
205 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1974).
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the Court of Appeals held that nonuse of an available seatbelt
should go to reduce the plaintiff's damage recovery. 06 The Curry
court found its adoption of the contributory negligence approach
to be justified in light of Spier's recognition that such an approach
was applicable only if the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care
had caused the accident.20 7 In this regard, Justice Brown deemed it
questionable whether there would have been any accident at all
had the plaintiff been wearing the available seatbelt.20° The court
also noted that although Spier's rejection of the contributory neg-
ligence approach was based in part upon the fear that any recovery
by a contributorily negligent plaintiff would be barred,209 the in-
stant case was controlled by the comparative negligence doctrine,
which does not pose an absolute bar to the negligent plaintiff's
recovery.2 10
It is submitted that the Curry court correctly determined that
a plaintiff's failure to wear an available seatbelt may be considered
by a jury as evidence of contributory negligence when such failure
is an alleged cause of the accident. Clearly, the Curry approach
does not conflict with the Spier decision, which expressly left this
issue open.211 It can be argued that Spier's "avoidable conse-
quences" approach is inappropriate when nonuse of a seatbelt
206 Id. In Spier, the plaintiff was travelling in her automobile at approximately 40 miles
per hour on New York Route 31, a highway with a speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Id. at
446, 323 N.E.2d at 165, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 917. As the plaintiff neared an intersection, she
allegedly reduced her speed to 20 miles per hour and began negotiating a left-hand turn. Id.
While in the westbound lane of the highway, the plaintiff's car was struck by the defen-
dant's tractor-trailer, which was attempting to pass the plaintiff's vehicle. Id. at 447, 323
N.E.2d at 165, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was thrown
from her automobile, which then rolled over her and pinned her legs under a wheel. Id., 323
N.E.2d at 165, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 918. The plaintiff was not wearing the seatbelts with which
the vehicle was equipped. Id. Clearly, the situation that existed in Spier is factually distin-
guishable from that of Curry insofar as, in the former, the plaintiff's nonuse of the available
seatbelt was not alleged to be a cause of the accident.
207 89 App. Div. 2d at 8, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315; see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 451,
323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (1974).
208 89 App. Div. 2d at 7, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
209 Id. at 8, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315; see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d
164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21 (1974).
210 89 App. Div. 2d at 8-9, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315-16; see infra note 216.
211 See 35 N.Y.2d 444, 451 n.3, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 n.3, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 n.3
(1974); supra note 192. It is interesting to note that the Curry court characterized its hold-
ing as "contrary to the general rule" established in Spier. 89 App. Div. 2d at 2, 454 N.Y.S.2d
at 312. It is suggested, however, that this language is misleading since the Spier Court un-
equivocally stated that its holding was not necessarily applicable to the situation in which
nonuse of a seatbelt is an alleged cause of the accident. See supra note 192.
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causes the accident. While both approaches are concerned with
conduct on the part of the plaintiff that contributes to his own
harm,212 and both deal with the plaintiff's failure to act reasona-
bly, 213 only the contributory negligence approach is applicable to
the situation in which a plaintiff acts negligently before any inju-
ries have been sustained.214 Furthermore, it has been noted that
the primary reason for any distinction between the two approaches
is the need, in a negligence action, for a defense that will apportion
damages and not bar all recovery.215 In light of the enactment of
the comparative negligence statute,216 however, it appears that
"avoidable consequences" is no longer essential to the fulfillment
of this need.
Notwithstanding the sound analytical basis for its decision, it
2 See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, § 65, at 423. Prosser has stated that "[b]oth con-
tributory negligence and avoidable consequences rest upon the same fundamental policy of
making recovery depend upon the plaintiff's proper care for the protection of his own inter-
ests. .. ." Id. The Restatement, Second, of Torts refers to the causal connection between
the harm suffered by the plaintiff and his contributorily negligent conduct as "conduct...
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in
bringing about the plaintiff's harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). The
Restatement also adopts the doctrine of avoidable consequences through its apportionment
of damages section, which states that a "plaintiff may be barred ... from recovery for so
much of the harm as is attributed to his own negligence." Id. § 465 comment c.
M12 See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, § 65, at 423. Prosser has observed that the doctrines
of contributory negligence and avoidable consequences "require of [a plaintiff] ... the stan-
dard of the reasonable man under the circumstances." Id. (footnote omitted). According to
the Restatement, Second, of Torts, the attributes of a "reasonable man" required by society
to protect himself and others, include "attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 comment b (1965). For discussions of whether a
reasonable man would wear a seatbelt in light of the overwhelming evidence indicating the
protection that it affords, see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168-69,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 386-87, 149 N.W.2d 626,
639-40 (1967); Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 172,
184-86 (1970); Snyder, Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 211, 211 (1970).
N4 See W. PROSSER, supra note 64, § 65, at 423. Prosser has observed that
the distinction between the two [approaches] is that contributory negligence is
negligence of the plaintiff before any damage . . . has occurred, which bars all
recovery. The rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong
has occurred, but while some damages may still be averted ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
2'5 See id.
216 CPLR 1411 (1976). Section 1411 of the CPLR states:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury,... the culpable con-
duct attributable to the claimant .... including contributory negligence ...
shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant ... bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
Id. (emphasis added).
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is submitted that the Curry court strayed from its fundamentally
correct premise. After concluding that the contributory negligence
approach controls when the plaintiff's nonuse of an available
seatbelt causes the accident,217 the court added that, if the jury
determines that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in
failing to wear a seatbelt, the avoidable consequences approach of
Spier must then be applied in order to reduce the plaintiff's recov-
ery.218 As the Spier Court itself recognized, however, its decision is
not applicable to the situation in which the plaintiff's nonuse of an
available seatbelt causes the accident.1 In such cases, it is submit-
ted, the contributory negligence approach alone is applicable. The
troublesome aspect of the Curry decision is that although the court
rationally concluded that contributory negligence, rather than
avoidable consequences, is the correct approach when failure to use
a seatbelt causes the accident, its holding seems to permit the jury
to consider both.
Craig Noble Touma
Tape recording made by criminal suspect prior to suicide attempt
and delivered to attorney is privileged
Private papers obtained by an attorney in the course of the
attorney-client relationship220 will be protected from discovery if
217 89 App. Div. 2d at 8, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
218 Id. at 9, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 316. The court declared that "[iln the event the jury deter-
mines that plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt did not constitute contributory negligence
.... then under the general rule in Spier such conduct may still be considered in mitiga-
tion of damages." Id.
219 35 N.Y.2d at 451 n.3, 323 N.E.2d at 168 n.3, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.3; see supra note
192.
220 New York has codified the attorney-client privilege at section 4503(a) of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules, which provides:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential com-
munication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the
course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose
such communication. . ..
CPLR 4503(a) (1963). At common law, an attorney could not disclose communications made
to him in the course of his professional employment without his client's consent. 2 E. CoN-
RAD, MODERN TRuIL EVIDENCE § 1082, at 257 (1956). This rule was intended to promote
confidence and the free flow of information between a lawyer and his client so that legal
problems would be more thoroughly analyzed and justice more effectively administered. See
id.; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 163, § 87, at 175-76. The privilege afforded by section
4503(a) of the CPLR extends only to revelations made for the purpose of seeking a lawyer's
